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Retail competition today can be described by three main features: i) oligopolistic com-
petition, ii) multi-store settings, and iii) the presence of large economies of scale. In these
markets, firms usually apply a centralized decisions making process in order to take full
advantage of economies of scales, e.g. retail distribution centers. In this paper, we model
and analyze the stability and chaos of retail competition considering all these issues. In
particular, a dynamic multi-market Cournot-Nash equilibrium with global economies and
diseconomies of scale model is developed. We confirm the non-intuitive hypothesis that
retail multi-store competition is more unstable that traditional small business that cover
the same demand. The main sources of stability are the scale parameter and the number
of markets.
Keywords: Multi-market Oligopoly, Cournot-Nash competition, Economies of Scale,
Stability, Bifurcations, and Chaos.
1 Introduction
In an oligopolistic setting under a Cournot scheme [1], the strategy of each economic
player depends on its own quantity decision, and on its rival’s reaction. Puu was the
first to explicitly show the complex dynamics of the oligopolistic setting under simple
assumptions (isoelastic demand function and constant marginal cost) for two and three
players [2–4]. This kind of analysis has grown significantly during the last decade in both,
the mathematics and complex systems literature, as well as in the economically-oriented
journals.
Indeed, since the Puu’s approach, several games has been developed for the study
of the market stability, focusing on: different demand or price function [5, 6], number
of players [7, 8], behavioral assumptions (naive [9–11], versus adaptive [12, 13], bounded
rationality [6, 14, 15] or heterogeneous expectations [16–19]). In terms of the cost function
definition, several developments has been proposed as well, as non-linear cost function
[6, 13, 15, 19, 20], capacity constraints |[13, 21–23] and some spillover effects [24–27].
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Most works in this line of research have concentrated in single markets with linear
production structures (i.e. assuming constant returns to scale). Nevertheless, oligopolis-
tic competition today seems to present multi-market phenomena and, in some cases, they
showcase important economies of scale, especially in the retail industry. Indeed, super-
market chains and retailers of food, gasoline, supplies and services all compete for market
share through multi-store formats over geographically separated markets. This localized
competition is presented in different levels: city, region, or country. In this context,
companies segment their strategies, tailoring their selected outcome for different types of
consumers and competitors, which vary by geographical location. On the other hand, on
the supply side, multi-market retailers usually try to take full advantages of their size, in
other words, their economies of scale. For instance, through the development of distri-
butions centers that attend most of the stores in an specific territory. Thus, as the cost
structure of multi-market retails depends on the total volume of the produced goods, the
individual cost structure of each store is usually coupled with the whole business. It is
important to point out that, this system of production, implies a centralized decisions
making process, which become in practice an extremely difficult task. Summing up, retail
competition today can be described by three main features: i) oligopolistic competition,
ii) multi-store setting, iii) the presence of economies of scale.
Applications of the Cournot scheme into the multi-market problem has been proposed
before by economists, for example, in the case of international trade. Some of these
works modeled the presence of economies of scale, for the domestic and foreign markets,
considering the size (quantity produced) and other properties of firms [28–35]. Thus, for
instance in a work of Krugman [30], a multi-market Cournot model with economies of
scale was used to explain the successful performance of Japan as an exporting country at
the beginning of the 1980s.
In theoretical terms, the multi-market oligopoly framework was revisited and general-
ized in the seminal paper by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer [36]. One of their main
remarks is that the presence of a multi-store firm in a market may affect the position in
the others for the presence of demand and/or supply spillovers. In the same line, Bern-
heim and Whinston, [37], show that with scale economies, the multi-market contact may
produce “spheres of influence” [38], that occurs when each of the multi-market competing
firms may be more efficient in some subset of these markets and less efficient in others
(symmetric advantage) or when one firm is more efficient in all markets (absolute ad-
vantage). Despite these multi-market analysis, this literature has focused mainly on the
demand side of the problem, not the supply side. Specifically, they refer to multi-market
contact, when demands curves recognize substitution and complementarity of different
products.
In terms of the analysis of the dynamics of the multi-market Cournot problem, we
found only a few papers [39–42], focusing on different products and scope.
In this context, this research deals with the analysis of stability and chaos of multi-
market competition in the presence of economies and diseconomies of scale, extending this
way the analysis of the dynamics of the oligopolistic competition. Thus, we model the
main characteristics of the retail competition today, analysing the dynamics and stability
of this particular dynamic system, and we compare these results with the stability analysis
of traditional small business that cover the same demand, the classic Pu’s formulation.
The main hypothesis of the paper is that non-linear cost structures in multi-market
setting are important sources of instability in the game outcome. Particularly, we study
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the stability of a multi-market Cournot-Nash equilibrium with global economies of scale,
that is, the scale level that is related to the total production of firms, in all markets,
as opposed to local economies of scale presented at each store individually or linear
production structures. In this setting, the internal organization of a firm may affect its
performances over the markets and the global equilibrium [43]. For example, multi-market
firms that buy their products in a centralized manner, storing them in a distribution
center, to be redistributed afterwards to their retailers store in all markets usually operate
this way to obtain economies of scale in the process of buying and distribution. In this
paper, we assume this type of centralized structure where companies takes advantage of
their size, under economies of scale, that allow them to decrease the cost structure [44].
This papers is organized as follows: in section 2 classical models of the Cournot
problem are described and extended to the multi-market framework. In the section 3 a
Multi-market-Cournot problem is presented, considering interrelated cost structures and
economies of scale. In section 4, the study of the stability of the system is addressed and
generalized for the duopoly case. In the fifth section, the complex dynamics of the game
for different numbers markets and values of the scale parameter are shown by path graph-
ics and bifurcation diagrams. Finally, the main conclusions for this work are presented.
2 Baseline: Single market oligopoly models
The well-known Cournot-Theocharis model [45–48] proposed a Cournot Oligopoly model
with inverse lineal demand function and constant marginal cost, that is:
P = a−
∑
qi (2.1)
Ci = ciqi (2.2)
where i = 1, . . . , N identify the player, P is the price of the good, C is the total cost and
q is the quantity.
The profit is obtained subtracting the revenues by total cost:
pii = qiP
(
q1, . . . , qN
)− ciqi
The optimization problem (maximization of profit) arrives to:
∗
qi= a− c
i
2 −
∑
k 6=i
qk
2 (2.3)
With solution (Cournot-Nash equilibrium point):
∗
qi=
a− ci +N (c¯− ci)
N + 1
3
with c¯ = (1/N)
∑
i c
i
In order to transform the static game 2.3 into a dynamic one, the Cournot or naive
strategy is used (see Cournot [1] and Puu [2])1. Thus, the long run map as an iterative
process is given by:
qi(t+ 1) = a− c
i
2 −
∑
k 6=i
qk(t)
2 (2.4)
The dynamical system of N reaction functions defined by 2.4 has a stable equilibrium
(fix point) for n ≤ 2 . For n = 3 the equilibrium is neutrally stable (stationary oscillations)
and for n ≥ 4 the equilibrium becomes unstable.
A generalization of the Cournot-Theocharis problem was developed by Fisher [49].
This research allows to work with increasing or decreasing returns to scale (i.e., economies
or diseconomies of scale). In order to get this result, we need to add a non-linear term to
the traditional linear cost function:
P = a−
∑
i
qi
Ci = ciqi + d
(
qi
)2
Thus, the profit takes the following form:
pii = qiP
(
q1, . . . , qN
)− ciqi − d (qi)2 (2.5)
Some restrictions for avoiding non-negativity of outputs, price, profits and marginal
cost are considered: c > 0, a ≥ c and d > −1/2.
Thus, the maximization of the profit (eq. 2.5) leads to the best response of the ith-
firm:
∗
qi=
a−
∑
k 6=i
qk − ci
2 (1 + d) (2.6)
Then, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is given by:
1In this strategy, it is assumed that a player at time of the decision making process, it takes into
account the rival’s previous output, e.g, managers use past information and supposes it doesn’t change
at this moment.
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(
a− ci) (1 + 2d) +N (c¯− ci)
4d2 + 2 (N + 2) d+N + 1
Hence, the naive dynamics takes the form:
qi(t+ 1) =
a−
∑
k 6=i
qk(t)− ci
2 (1 + d) (2.7)
Finally, this dynamical system becomes stable when (N − 3) /2 < d . Thus, if there
are two players the game has a stable equilibrium if d > −1/2.
The approaches revised above (Teocharis and Fisher), were design to model a single-
market oligopoly problem (for example the rivalry between “mom-and-pop” stores). In
this case, both the prices and the costs don’t depends upon the behavior of the players in
other markets, because they did not consider the case of large corporations, with multiple
operations in various locations.
In the next section, and taking as baseline the models presented above, we will develop
a multi-market Cournot model with economies of scale that will allow us to describe the
modern retail competition.
3 The Model
Let us consider a multi-market oligopoly where N single-product firms compete in M
markets. All markets are very far away, so there not exist arbitrage possibilities. Each
market has its own price (from a linear demand function). Then, if qij is the quantity of
the ith company at the market j and Qj the market supply, the selling price at the jth
market is given by,
Pj = aj −
∑
i
qij = aj −Qj (3.1)
We assume a centralized managerial structure, where the production costs depends
of the total outputs of each firm. Besides, due both their size and specialization the
company can have economies of scale. So we have:
Ci = ci
∑
j
qij + d
∑
j
qij
2 = ciQi + d (Qi)2 (3.2)
with ci greater than zero. Depending of the value of d the companies operates under
economies of scale (d < 0) or diseconomies of scale (d > 0). The allowable range for the
parameter d will be analyzed later.
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The square form of the production cost was used previously for other scholars in a
single-market context [6, 49–51]. However, for this multi-market scheme we use the non-
linearity for to couple the costs and to enable the existence of economies (diseconomies)
of scale. This is a realistic approach for the retails firms, because they produce or buy in
large scale.
Under this cost structure, ci > 0 and dQimax > −ci/2 , where Qimax is the maximum
level of production of firm i. The theoretical maximum production (extreme case) is
achieved when a company becomes a monopoly in all the markets (i.e. Qj = qij ,∀j). As
Pj ≥ 0, we have
∑
j aj > Q
i
max, and then we have 2d > ci/
∑
j aj .
Thus the profit function of each firm depends upon each market price, the quantity
sold by the firm in that particular market, and the total cost of the firm, that considers
the sum of the global cost and the local cost:
pii =
∑
j
qijPj − Ci (3.3)
=
∑
j
qij
(
aj − bj
∑
i
qij
)
− ciQi − d (Qi)2 (3.4)
The managerial decision of each firm is to choose the quantity qij that maximizes its
profits. In other words, the ith company which produces a total output of Qi divided over
the M different markets according to the output vector Qi =
{
qi1, q
i
2, . . . , q
i
M ,
}
needs to
fix the optimal allocation given by
∗
Qi=
{ ∗
qi1,
∗
qi2, . . . ,
∗
qiM
}
, where each one of the
∗
qij is a
solution of theM×N simultaneous equations which comprising the first order conditions
of this game given by:
∂pii
∂qij
= aj −Qj − qij − ci − 2dQi = 0 (3.5)
Defining the residual market supply for i as Q˜ij = Qj − qij , and the participation of
the firm i in other markets different to j as Qˆij = Qi − qij , the equilibrium quantity take
the value:
∗
qij=
aj − Q˜ij − ci − 2dQˆij
2 (1 + d) (3.6)
Clearly, the allocation decision depends on the decision of the other players on this
market, and also depends on the participation of the firm in other markets (or the total
firm supply). This results is consistent with the Cournot intuition and consistent to
previous results for the single-market problem2 [20, 49, 52].
2When Q˜i = 0
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In order to keep the game on rails, we have that
∗
qij is a maximum if and only if d > −1.
Also the marginal profit for zero output must be non-negative [49], so aj ≥ ci,∀i. This
conditions joined with the previous restrictions arrives to:
d > − 12m (3.7)
The profit of each firm at the equilibrium point is given by:
pii =
∑
j
( ∗
qij
)2
+ d
∑
j
∗
qij
 2 (3.8)
The Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium is given by:
J =

∂
∗
Q1
∂Q1
∂
∗
Q1
∂Q2
· · · ∂
∗
Q1
∂QN
∂
∗
Q2
∂Q1
∂
∗
Q2
∂Q2
· · · ∂
∗
Q2
∂QN
... . . .
...
∂
∗
QN
∂Q1
∂
∗
QN
∂Q2
· · · ∂
∗
QN
∂QN

(3.9)
where each one of the N ×N entries of J is a M ×M block matrix, that represents the
change of the i-firm’s reaction functions with respect to the outputs of j, with:
∂
∗
Qi
∂Qk
=

∂
∗
q
i
1
∂qk1
∂
∗
q
i
1
∂qk2
· · · ∂
∗
q
i
1
∂qkM
∂
∗
q
i
2
∂qk1
∂
∗
q
i
2
∂qk2
· · · ∂
∗
q
i
2
∂qkM... . . .
...
∂
∗
q
i
M
∂qk1
∂
∗
q
i
M
∂qk2
· · · ∂
∗
q
i
M
∂qkM

(3.10)
According to our optimal outputs (Eq. 3.6), we have:
∂
∗
Qi
∂Qk
=
{
− 12(1+d)IM×M , for i 6= j
H , for i = j
(3.11)
where I is the identity matrix and H is a zero-diagonal matrix with all the off-diagonal
entries equal to −d/(1 + d).
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4 Dynamic Analysis of the Equilibrium
For the dynamic modeling, we use naive expectations. Thus, the game is developed on
discrete time as follow3:
qij(t+ 1) =
aj − Q˜ij(t)− ci − 2dQˆi(t)
2 (1 + d) (4.1)
When there are two players competing over M different markets, the long-run map
proposed in 4.1 is defining for the following 2m equations:
q11(t+ 1) =
a1 − q21(t)− c1 − 2d
(
q12(t) + q13(t) + . . .+ q1M (t)
)
2 (1 + d) (4.2)
...
...
q1j (t+ 1) =
aj − q2j (t)− c1 − 2d
(
q11(t) + . . .+ q1j−1(t) + q1j+1(t) . . .+ q1M (t)
)
2 (1 + d)
...
...
q1M (t+ 1) =
aM − q2M (t)− c1 − 2d
(
q11(t) + q13(t) + . . .+ q1M−1(t)
)
2 (1 + d)
q21(t+ 1) =
a1 − q11(t)− c2 − 2d
(
q22(t) + q23(t) + . . .+ q2M (t)
)
2 (1 + d)
...
...
q2j (t+ 1) =
aj − q1j (t)− c2 − 2d
(
q21(t) + . . .+ q2j−1(t) + q2j+1(t) . . .+ q2M (t)
)
2 (1 + d)
...
...
q2M (t+ 1) =
aM − q1M (t)− c2 − 2d
(
q21(t) + q23(t) + . . .+ q2M−1(t)
)
2 (1 + d)
The nontrivial Cournot-Nash equilibrium point for the previous set of equations (static
solution) is given by:
3The dynamic proposed in 4.1 can lead to negative outputs without economic sense. Following [53],
we will differentiate between two types of trajectories: admissible and feasible. Calling T the map defined
by the 2m equations of the game, the set of admissible (S) and feasible points (F ) is defined respectively
by:
S =
{(
q11 , q
1
2 , . . . , q
1
M , q
2
1 , q
2
2 , . . . , q
M
2
)
∈ R2M+ : Tn
(
q11 , q
1
2 , . . . , q
1
M , q
2
1 , q
2
2 , . . . , q
M
2
)
∈ R2M ∀n > 0
}
F =
{(
q11 , q
1
2 , . . . , q
1
M , q
2
1 , q
2
2 , . . . , q
M
2
)
∈ R2M+ : Tn
(
q11 , q
1
2 , . . . , q
1
M , q
2
1 , q
2
2 , . . . , q
M
2
)
∈ R2M+ ∀n > 0
}
Then, the mathematical results are based on the admissible trajectories. However, in the economic
context, only the feasible points will be considered.
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∗
qij=
(
aj − ci
)
(1 + 2Md) + ck − ci
3 + (2M)2 d2 + 8Md
+ 23
M (aj − a¯)
(
2Md2 + d
)
3 + (2M)2 d2 + 8Md
, d 6= − 32M ,−
1
2M
(4.3)
Using the equations3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 the Jacobian matrix for the system is defined
by:
J2xM =

Mtimes

0 − d1+d · · · − d1+d
− d1+d 0 · · · − d1+d
... . . .
...
− d1+d − d1+d . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
− 12(1+d) 0 · · · 0
0 − 12(1+d) · · · 0
... . . .
...
0 0 · · · − 12(1+d)
Mtimes
− 12(1+d) 0 · · · 0
0 − 12(1+d) · · · 0
... . . .
...
0 0 · · · − 12(1+d)
0 − d1+d · · · − d1+d
− d1+d 0 · · · − d1+d
... . . .
...
− d1+d − d1+d 0

(4.4)
The characteristic equation of 4.4 takes the form:
(
λ− 12 2d+1(1+d)
)m−1 (
λ− 12 2d−1(1+d)
)m−1 (
λ+ 12
2(m−1)d+1
(1+d)
)(
λ+ 12
2(m−1)d−1
(1+d)
)
= 0 (4.5)
Thus, we have four4 different eigenvalues:
λ1 = −2 (m− 1) d+ 12 (1 + d) (4.6)
λ2 = −2 (m− 1) d− 12 (1 + d)
λ3,...,m+1 =
2d+ 1
2 (1 + d)
λm+2,...,2m =
2d− 1
2 (1 + d)
The local stability of equilibrium is achieved only if each eigenvalue is within the unit
circle. According to 4.6 this is fulfilled when:
4If we fix M = 1, we have only the two first eigenvalues.
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Figure 4.1: Stabililty zone (blue lines) for a duopoly depending of the number of markets
and the values for d.

− 12m < d <
1
2 (m− 2) , m 6= 2
d > −14 , m = 2
(4.7)
By 4.7 is clear that stability of the duopoly game depends on both the scale parameter (d)
and the number of markets (m). In the fig. 4.1 the relationship betweenm and d, in order
of to arrive to the stability of the game is shown. When m=1,2 the equilibrium becomes
unstable only if d>-1/(2m). However, if m>3, we need to put an upper bound for the
stability condition. We see that when the number of markets increases, the stability is
achieved only if d tends to zero.
5 Numerical simulations
Using numerical simulations we can see how the complex dynamics of the equilibrium
depends on the scale parameter (d), using a scheme of duopolists competing on three
markets (2 × 3 game). The results of our model (blue) will be compared with the base
model (red) proposed by Fisher (see section 2) under identical parameter values.
In the figs. 5.1 and 5.2 we show the dynamic of the quantity allocated by player 1 in
market 1 according to several values of d.
For d = −0.1 and d = 0.2 (figs. 5.1b and 5.2a) we have that the equilibrium under
naive expectations reaches the equilibrium in both models.
When d = 0 (fig. 5.1c), the models no longer have advantages/disadvantages of
scale production, being both the same schemes that the Cournot-Teocharis approach (see
section 2).
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As seen in the fig. 5.2b, for the critical point d = 1/2, the dynamic goes to station-
ary oscillations (neutrally stable) for the retail competition while for the single-market
approach arrives quickly to the equilibrium .
For the case of figs. 5.1a and 5.2c the dynamic of the Fisher model remains stable but
in our model lead to a chaotic behavior.
The figure 5.3 show the complex dynamic of the the quantity q11 by means of bifur-
cation diagrams, using values of d from the interval [−0.17; 0.52] . The decentralized
model shows stability of the equilibrium for all the values examined. By contrast, in our
model the chaos is achieved outside the critical points (d < −1/6 and d > 1/2, as it was
predicted by the analytical results of the duopoly case, see eq. 4.7). In the stability zone
(fig. 5.3b), we can observe how the centralized managerial decision takes advantage in
terms of production when the company operates under economies of scale in relation to
the disaggregated model; while at diseconomies of scale, the production performance of
the local model are less affected than the multi-market scheme.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we analyze the stability of a multi-store retail competition model. Specifi-
cally, we model an oligopoly system with multi-market competition. The model considers
the impact of the firm’s economies or diseconomies of scale. In one extreme, the multi-
store retail maintain a centralized decision making process, optimizing global economies
of scale due to its global size. On the other hand, we have local oligopolistic competition,
where the same demand is served by different firms that compete in only one market.
Our model confirms the fact that economies and diseconomies of scale make the Cournot
equilibrium very unstable for certain values of the scale parameter of the producers. Ad-
ditionally, the number of markets, as expected, tends to contribute to this instability.
One very interesting further research is to expand the multi-market oligopolistic model
to a multi-product setting.
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Figure 5.1: Dynamic of q11 (solid line) and Cuornot equilibrium (dots), for different values
of d, under the proposed retail competition (blue) and the Fisher approach (independent
sellers) (red); with a1 = 200, a2 = 150, a3 = 100, c1 = 20, c2 = 40.
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Figure 5.2: Dynamic of q11 (solid line) and Cuornot equilibrium (dots), for different values
of d, under the proposed retail competition (blue) and the Fisher approach (red); with
a1 = 200, a2 = 150, a3 = 100, c1 = 20, c2 = 40.
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